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REGULATORY REFORM IN THE U.K.
MICHAEL W. TAYLOR*
Since the Global Financial Crisis first developed in 2007, both
the United States and the United Kingdom have embarked on ambitious
programs of regulatory reform that have placed them at the forefront of
the international "re-regulation" of finance. The U.S. and U.K. have
been among the chief drivers of the international process of re-
regulation that has been conducted in networks of international standard
setting bodies such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and
the Financial Stability Board. However, even within a framework of
broad agreement within the international standard setting process, there
are differences between the British and U.S. approaches that reflect both
industry structures and domestic political factors. In this essay, I will
concentrate on the two major dimensions of the U.K.'s reform program
where these differences are especially evident: the institutional structure
of regulation, in particular the adoption of the so-called "Twin Peaks"
structure, and the approach to ending the "Too Big to Fail" (TBTF)
problem. With respect to the first of these dimensions, the regulatory
response to the financial crisis in the U.K. reflects a very different
institutional starting point to that of the U.S., since the reforms have
involved the de-merger of a single regulatory agency, and the return of
powers to the central bank, in contrast to the agency consolidation
found in the U.S. There are greater commonalities between Britain and
the U.S. in their recognition of the TBTF problem and of the policy
measures needed to address it, but here too issues of domestic political
economy have exerted a powerful influence in shaping post-crisis
regulatory efforts.
I. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF REGULATION
One of the most eye-catching elements of the U.K.'s post-crisis
package of regulatory reforms has been the decision to dismantle the
Financial Services Authority, the U.K.'s single integrated regulator for
* Michael Taylor has formerly held staff appointments at a number of international financial
institutions, central banks, and regulatory bodies. He writes here in a personal capacity.
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banking, securities, and insurance, and to replace it with a "Twin Peaks"
structure involving separate prudential and business conduct regulators.
The Financial Services Act, which received its Royal Assent in
December 2012 and came into force on April 1, 2013, created two
successor agencies to the Financial Services Authority (FSA): the
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA).' The PRA is a specialist prudential regulator of all
deposit-taking institutions, insurance companies, and a limited number
of designated investment firms. An investment firm will be designated
if it either deals in securities as principal or has minimum capital of
C730,000. Firms that either do not deal as principal or which have
minimum capital below the threshold are prudentially regulated by the
FCA, which is also the business conduct regulator of all financial firms,
irrespective of whether or not they are prudentially regulated by the
PRA.
The concept of a "Twin Peaks" regulatory structure had been
extensively debated during the mid-1990s in the U.K., although at the
time its critics had dismissed it as far too radical, somewhat ironically in
view of the subsequent adoption of the even more radical single
regulator model.2 In summary, the Twin Peaks concept was based on
the observation that the evolution of modem financial markets had
blurred the boundaries between different types of firms and financial
products, rendering obsolete regulatory systems that were structured
around specific types of financial firms (the "institutional" model) or
types of financial products (the "functional" approach.) In place of
these traditional agency structures, Twin Peaks proposed a regulatory
system structured around the different objectives of regulation-broad
financial system stability and consumer protection. These objectives
ought to be the responsibility of different agencies-the eponymous
"Twin Peaks"-since they involved fundamentally different skills and
expertise, and would sometimes involve policy trade-offs that were best
1. Improving Regulation of the Financial Sector to Protect Customers and the
Economy, HM TREASURY (Apr. 24, 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/govemment/policies/improving-regulation-of-the-financial-sector-to-
protect-customers-and-the-economy.
2. See generally, Michael W. Taylor, "Twin Peaks": A Regulatory Structure for the
New Century, 20 CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF FIN. INNOVATION (1995); for a discussion of the
debate inspired by this paper, see also, Michael W. Taylor, The Road from "Twin Peaks "
and the Way Back, 16 CoNN. INs. L.J. 61 (2009) [hereinafter Taylor, Road from "Twin
Peaks"].
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clearly articulated and dealt with in the public realm rather than within
the confines of an agency. This concept was subsequently influential in
shaping regulatory structures in Australia and the Netherlands, but the
1997 decision to move to a single integrated regulator in the U.K.
appeared to have removed the prospect that it would ever be
implemented there.
The formation of the FSA was justified, at least retrospectively,
using arguments similar to those deployed in favor of the Twin Peaks
model,3 but it represented an even more radical consolidation of nine
previously existing specialist regulators that were responsible for both
prudential and business conduct matters. 4 Defenders of this experiment
argued that a single financial regulator was necessary to provide
effective oversight of diversified financial conglomerate groups, to
ensure seamless consumer protection regulation of products that were
increasingly difficult to slot into traditional contractual forms, and to
achieve economies of scale and scope in the utilization of regulatory
resources. One of the most controversial aspects of the new
institutional structure was that it combined both prudential and business
conduct regulation within a single agency. The combination of
functions was justified on the grounds that many relevant supervisory
judgments overlapped, and that there were synergies between the two
forms of regulation. Nonetheless, it was a degree of consolidation that
went further than previous attempts to establish integrated financial
regulatory agencies, most of which had been in the comparatively small
Scandinavian financial systems.
Although some critics were skeptical about the viability of a
single financial regulator for a financial sector as large and as diverse as
that of the U.K., there was little genuine debate about the merits of this
institutional structure before it was implemented. In contrast to the
standard practice for major government decisions in the U.K., which are
often preceded by a report from an independent commission and a
3. Clive Briault, The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator 6
(Fin. Servs. Auth., Paper No. 2, 1999), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
occpapers/OP02.pdf.
4. The nine agencies comprised the Securities and Investments Board, the Personal
Investment Authority, the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation, the Securities
and Futures Authority, the Supervision and Surveillance Division of the Bank of England,
the Building Societies Commission, the Insurance Directorate of the Department of Trade
and Industry, the Friendly Societies Commission, and the Registrar of Friendly Societies.
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"White Paper" setting out the government's legislative intentions, the
decision to create the FSA was announced without any prior public
consultation or discussion after the government had been in office for
less than a few weeks. This mode of decision-making has fueled
suspicions that it was driven by the demands of the legislative timetable
in which the Treasury, as the responsible ministry, was restricted to only
being able to introduce one bill during the first session of the new
parliament.5  The result was that plans to reform business conduct
regulation separately from banking supervision had to be shelved.
Instead, the legislation designed to grant the Bank of England
independence in respect of monetary policy was also used to transfer its
bank regulatory function to another agency, the Securities and
Investments Board, thereby setting in motion the process that led to the
creation of the FSA. The relevant legislation was prepared within the
first weeks of the new parliament, with the transfer of powers being
added relatively late in the process. One consequence of the way in
which this decision was reached, the speed with which the formation of
the FSA was announced, and lack of prior consultation on the decision
was that the relationship between the FSA and the Bank of England did
not receive detailed consideration, even though the new institutional
structure involved removing banking supervision from the central bank,
an issue that had not arisen in the Scandinavian models that were
invoked by the FSA's architects. Nonetheless, the upshot was that the
relationship between the central bank, as lender of last resort and crisis
manager, and the agency responsible for supervising individual firms, is
one of the most important issues in designing a regulatory structure and
was largely neglected in designing the post-1997 arrangements. A
"Tripartite Agreement" between the Treasury, Bank of England, and
FSA attempted to paper over the cracks, but as the crisis was to
demonstrate, it was largely ineffective.
Nonetheless, these shortcomings were not exposed until the
financial crisis first manifested in the U.K. with the failure of the
mortgage bank, Northern Rock, in September 2007. Before then the
FSA model had won many plaudits, including from the International
Monetary Fund, which observed in 1998 that:
In the United Kingdom, where financial regulation has been
5. Taylor, Roadfrom "Twin Peaks," supra note 2, at 71-72.
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spread thus far among nine separate bodies, the shift to a single
regulator will clarify regulation and improve supervision of increasingly
integrated multi-sector financial institutions. Unified supervision of
complex financial groups will also strengthen the FSA's ability to
regulate the City's large, internationally integrated financial market.
Consumer protection, a major mandate of the FSA, should also be
strengthened and become more uniform. 6
In particular, the FSA's "principles-based" approach to
regulation, which attempted to put the onus for compliance with
regulatory standards on a firm's management, was widely viewed as
having contributed to the relative success of the City of London as an
international financial center. A 2006 study commissioned by New
York Mayor Bloomberg and Senator Schumer, and conducted by the
consultancy firm McKinsey, identified the U.K.'s principles-based
approach as a source of competitive advantage vis-a-vis New York. The
report commented that
[b]usiness leaders increasingly perceive the UK's single,
principles-based financial sector regulator - the
Financial Services Authority (FSA) - as superior to
what they see as a less responsive, complex US system
of multiple holding company and industry segment
regulators at the federal and state levels. Regulatory
enforcement style also matters, with the UK's measured
approach to enforcement seen as more results-oriented
and effective than a US approach sometimes described
as punitive and overly public.7
Thus, for all the radicalism of the U.K.'s institutional change and
the lack of prior debate, it appeared by 2006 that the experiment had
been a great success.
In 1997 the Labour government's decision to create the FSA
was met with relatively muted opposition despite it being made with
6. INT'L MONETARY FUND, CONCLUDING REMARKS OF 1998 ARTICLE IV
CONSULTATION-UNITED KINGDOM 3 (1998), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/1998/122198.htm.
7. THE CITY OF N.Y. OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US'
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 17 (2007), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/htmi/om/pdf/nyreport final.pdf.
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little advance preparation or prior public debate. Few critics were
prepared to challenge the concept of a single regulator and they gained
little traction in an environment where the government enjoyed
widespread popularity and a substantial opinion poll lead over the
defeated Conservative party. Importantly, the decision to create the
FSA was not opposed by the Conservatives; their attention focused
instead on ensuring that the new regulator did not become an
unaccountable bureaucratic "Leviathan" that would be unresponsive to
the financial industry.8 However, as the full extent of the government
support needed by the banking sector became apparent in early 2009,
there were clear signs that the Conservative opposition was beginning to
rethink its earlier (and at least tacit) acceptance of the case for a single
integrated regulator. A policy paper prepared for the party by Sir James
Sassoon-a former investment banker and former advisor to Labour
Finance Minister Alastair Darling-advocated adoption of a "Twin
Peaks" structure that would involve the institutional separation of
prudential from business conduct regulation.9  Importantly, the
prudential "Peak" would form one of the functions of an enhanced Bank
of England. A similar proposal was put forward by a senior banker, Sir
Martin Jacomb, in a paper for the Conservative party aligned think tank,
the Centre for Policy Studies.' 0
It has been argued that there was nothing fundamentally wrong
with the FSA model and that it would have been possible to address the
shortcomings that became apparent during the crisis without
fundamental institutional reform." Critics have argued that the U.K.
government embarked on structural reform of regulation for political
8. See e.g., MARTIN MCELWEE & ANDREW TYRIE, CTR. FOR POLICY STUDIES,
LEVIATHAN AT LARGE: THE NEw REGULATOR FOR THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 1-2 (2000)
[hereinafter McELWEE & TYRIE], available at https://andrewtyie-
admin.conservativewebsites.org.uk/sites/www.andrewtyrie.com/files/leviathan-atlarge.pdf
(arguing "[tihe FSA will be the most powerful, and one of the least accountable, institutions
created in the United Kingdom since the War. It will be, in many respects, legislator,
investigator, prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner.").
9. James Sassoon, Britain Deserves Better Financial Regulation, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 8,
2009, 7:05 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3decd86c-Oc13-11 de-b87d-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2TSV3T3uD.
10. MARTIN JACOMB, CTR. FOR POLICY STUDIES, RE-EMPOWER THE BANK OF ENGLAND
2-4 (2009), available at http://www.cps.org.uk/cps-catalog/Reempower%20the
%20Bank%20of/o20England.pdf.
I1. See Eilis Ferran, The Break-up of the Financial Services Authority, 31 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUDIES 455, 460-461 (2011).
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reasons rather than because there were compelling policy reasons for it
to do so; in particular, it is argued that reform provided an opportunity
for the government to pin the failures of regulation, which had led to
substantial bail-out costs, on its predecessor. While politics no doubt
played a role in the government's decision to embark on its reforms,
there were also strong policy considerations for it to do so. The relative
absence of a policy debate prior to the FSA's creation meant that the
post-1997 institutional structure rested on flimsy intellectual
foundations. The issue of crisis management arrangements and
connection with the lender of last resort has already been mentioned;
reliance on the Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding resulted in a
situation in which, as a Committee of the House of Lords put it with
some exasperation, "no one was in charge" of managing the crisis.1 2
There were also two further factors that resulted in a
reassessment of the FSA model. The first was the desire to create an
institutional structure in which prudential regulation at the level of the
individual firm was closely integrated with a post-crisis emphasis on
monitoring and controlling risks across the financial system as a whole
(referred to as "micro-prudential" and "macro-prudential" regulation
respectively.) Secondly, the experience of the crisis appeared to
demonstrate that an agency that combined both prudential and business
conduct regulation would face a constant struggle to reconcile these
different objectives, and that doing so would place excessive demands
on the attention of senior management. It seemed increasingly clear
that one of the two objectives would be dominant at any particular time
to the detriment of the agency's ability to fulfill the other objective. If
the aim of public policy was to ensure that both objectives were pursued
equally vigorously, then it became increasingly apparent that an agency
with responsibility for both of them was a sub-optimal solution.
With respect to the first factor, as Sir James Sassoon explained
in a newspaper interview, the crisis experience had demonstrated the
need to put "macro-prudential" regulation at the heart of the supervisory
system and to ensure that macroeconomic policy and policies for
financial stability were properly coordinated. 1 The focus on "macro-
12. 737 PARL. DEB., H.L.(7th ser.) (2012) 13 (U.K.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/han 13.pdf
13. Louise Armitstead & Philip Aldrick, Sir James Sassoon: Why I Told the Tories to
Scrap the FSA, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Jul. 25, 2009, 9:15 PM), available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/5906113/Sir-James-Sassoon-why-I-told-
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prudential" regulation was an important post-crisis innovation in the
regulatory system as policymakers concluded that a focus on the
soundness of individual institutions had neglected the risks to the
system as a whole. By concentrating only on what came to be referred
to as "micro-prudential" regulation-i.e., the safety and soundness of
individual institutions-the pre-crisis regulatory system had missed the
build-up of risks across the system as a whole. Micro-prudential
supervision might be described as having committed the fallacy of
composition: the assumption that if firms were individually well-
capitalized and financially sound, the same would be true of the system
as a whole. Yet this neglected important dimensions in which the
soundness of the system was not simply the sum of the soundness of
individual firms. One such issue was the build-up of risks over time, for
example the rapid rise in leverage across the financial system, including
in sectors that were not subject to regulation (the so-called "shadow
banking" sector). Another issue that cried out for a system-wide
perspective was the interconnectedness of markets, for example when
margin calls in one market triggered selling in another, thus leading to a
downward spiral in asset prices in general. Policymakers began to
explore tools for addressing both of these dimensions of systemic risk.
Among the instruments that were added to the new macro-
prudential tool kit were capital requirements that varied according to the
state of the economic cycle and targeted adjustments to the risk
weighting applied to certain assets (for example loans to commercial
property or mortgage loans).14 Although macro-prudential in purpose,
many of these instruments applied at the level of individual institutions.
Hence, the addition of a macro-prudential dimension to the supervisory
system raised issues of institutional structure, in particular how best to
coordinate the application of policies at both a system-wide and
individual institution level. An IMF working paper that examined the
range of possible institutional arrangements concluded that a "Twin
Peaks" structure with a close relationship between the central bank and
the prudential regulator would be the most efficient arrangement for
managing the relationship between micro- and macro-prudential
the-Tories-to-scrap-the-FSA.html.
14. See BANK OF ENG., INSTRUMENTS OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY (2011), available
at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/financialstability/discussion
paper I 11220.pdf.
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regulation.' 5  Hence the Conservative party's thinking on the future
structure of regulation was aligned with an emerging trend that
emphasized the importance of the macro-prudential dimension to policy
being well coordinated between the prudential regulator and the central
bank. To this extent, the justification for the proposed new structure
was consistent with a more traditionalist conception which had
emphasized that as lender of last resort (LLR) the central bank needed
access to information about the financial condition of specific banks
and, hence, (at least in some versions of the argument) needed also to be
the prudential regulator.' 6
The second factor that supported the decision to dismantle the
FSA was the observation that the integrated regulator had struggled to
hold in balance two different regulatory objectives: (i) maintaining the
safety and soundness of financial institutions; and (ii) protecting
consumers against the mis-selling of financial products. The FSA had
inherited responsibility for enforcing the U.K.'s extensive system of
consumer protection regulation created by the Financial Services Act
1986.17 This Act had imposed a set of detailed business conduct rules
for securities and investments as an overlay to the prudential regulatory
regimes that had been applied to banks and insurance companies. The
Self-Regulating Organizations (SROs) that had been established to
apply these business conduct rules were organized along functional
lines, with different bodies applying rules to securities, futures and
options, asset management, and "packaged" financial products such as
life insurance. As the successor agency to the SRO system, a
substantial amount of the FSA's work was devoted to consumer
protection issues, in addition to its role as regulator of the safety and
soundness of banks and insurance companies.
As several reports on the FSA's regulation prior to the onset of
the 2007 crisis have emphasized, the regulatory agency's focus was on
the regulation of business conduct at the expense of prudential
15. Erlend Walter Nier, Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central
Banks: Lessons from the Crisis (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 09/70, 2009),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp0970.pdf
16. For an example of how the Bank of England's then Deputy Governor Howard
Davies understood the justification, see Howard Davies, Financial Regulation: Why, How
and By Whom?, BANK OF ENG. Q. BULL. 107, 111 (1997).
17. The Financial Services Act 1986 (confusingly also referred to as "the FSA") was
repealed and replaced by the Act that established the FSA, the Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000.
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regulation. The FSA's own inquiry into its supervision of Northern
Rock established that although there had been frequent contact with the
bank on consumer protection issues (an initiative referred to as "treating
customers fairly"), supervision of capital and liquidity had been
deficient and the bank had been placed in a category that subjected it to
a major prudential meeting once every three years. The FSA's own
report on Northern Rock stated that "some of the fundamentals of work
on assessing risks in firms (notably some of the core elements related to
prudential supervision, such as liquidity) have been squeezed out."18
A Committee of the House of Lords (the upper legislative
chamber in the U.K.) that examined the FSA's failings as the supervisor
of Northern Rock thought it could identify the reason why the agency
had failed to give sufficient attention to prudential regulation:
Conduct-of-business is important and politically sensitive, and
its results are easy to measure. In contrast, prudential supervision, while
arguably more important, is conducted privately; its success is less
easily measured, and, most of the time, it has a lower political impact
than conduct-of-business supervision though in times of crisis such as
the present its political impact, its effect on businesses, individuals and
the economy, is very much greater than conduct-of-business
supervision. It is natural and rational for a supervisor with responsibility
for both activities to concentrate on the one with the greater immediate
political sensitivity. 19
Consistent with this analysis, following the onset of the
financial crisis the FSA's attention shifted to prudential supervision to
the exclusion of its other functions. Post-crisis the issue "with the
greatest political sensitivity" was the prudential soundness of financial
firms, banks especially. Thus, from having been dominated by conduct-
of-business issues to the virtual exclusion of prudential supervision, the
post-2007 FSA came to be dominated by prudential concerns to the
detriment of its conduct of business role. The shift of emphasis became
apparent in the FSA's discharge of its non-prudential functions,
including the extent to which it was active in following up on
18. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., INTERNAL AUDIT Div., THE SUPERVISION OF NORTHERN ROCK: A
LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 7 (2008), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/nr report.pdf.
19. SELECT COMM. ON ECON. AFFAIRS, BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, 2008-
9, H.L. 101-1, at 33 (U.K.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/palld2008O9/idselect/1deconaf/101/101i.pdf.
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allegations that LIBOR (the London Interbank Offered Rate) was being
manipulated by traders at several leading banks. The FSA's handling of
this issue led to criticism from a parliamentary committee for being
"two years behind" the U.S. regulatory agencies, and its own internal
audit report concluded that
the FSA's focus on dealing with the implications of the
financial crisis for the capital and liquidity positions of
individual firms, together with the fact that contributing
to or administering LIBOR were not "regulated
activities," led to the FSA being too narrowly focused in
its handling of LIBOR related information. This was
both in terms of challenging and inquiring about that
information, and considering its conduct responsibilities
in relation to the Principles for Businesses and any
potential for consumer or market detriment. Our view is
strengthened by the fact that the FSA did go on to take
enforcement action in relation to the FSA's Principles
for Businesses.2 0
Commenting on the report, the FSA's Chairman, Lord Turner,
observed that "a particularly important lesson is the need to have staff
focused on conduct issues even when the world rightly assumes that the
biggest immediate concerns are prudential; and vice versa. The new
'twin peaks' model of regulation will deliver this." 21
It would be easy to dismiss the changes to the U.K.'s
institutional arrangements as mere window-dressing or, in a time-
honored phrase, "re-arranging the deckchairs on the Titanic." There is
certainly a pattern of political leaders engaging in post-crisis
institutional reforms, involving the closure or merger of existing
agencies and the creation of new ones.22 On occasion these reforms
20. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., INTERNAL AUDIT REPORT: A REVIEW OF THE EXTENT OF
AWARENESS WITHIN THE FSA OF INAPPROPRIATE LIBOR SUBMISsIoNs (2013), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/ia-libor.pdf.
21. Press Release, Fin. Servs. Auth., FSA Publishes Its Internal Audit Report On:
Review of the Extent of Awareness Within the FSA of Inappropriate LIBOR Submissions 2,
(Mar. 5, 2013), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2013/020.shtml.
22. Richard K. Abrams & Michael W. Taylor, Issues in the Unification ofFinancial
Sector Supervision (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 00/213), available at
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may be motivated by a genuine desire to improve the practice and
effectiveness of supervision, but in others they can be an example of
displacement activity, an attempt to being seen to "do something" in the
wake of financial crisis. As I have argued above, the U.K.'s reforms to
the structure of regulation do not fall into the latter category: they are
well-grounded in public policy considerations and represent a response
to genuine weaknesses identified during and after the financial crisis.
II. ADDRESSING "Too BIG TO FAIL"
Less controversial than reforming the institutional structures of
regulation has been the need to address the problem of TBTF financial
institutions. This has been a common theme running through many
recent reforms in the U.S., the U.K., and in international bodies such as
the Financial Services Board (FSB). The FSB has described TBTF
firms as institutions of such size, market importance, and
interconnectedness that their distress or failure would cause significant
dislocation in the financial system and adverse economic
consequences.23 Without an effective legislative, regulatory, and policy
framework to resolve such firms, their threatened failure leaves public
authorities no option but to bail them out, passing costs of failure to
taxpayers. TBTF firms thus benefit from a public subsidy. This has
deleterious consequences for market discipline, incentives, systemic
risk, and public finances.
The broad thrust of public policy, in both the Dodd-Frank Act in
the U.S. and in U.K. reforms, has been significantly to reduce the
probability of failure and the impact of failure of TBTF firms by
increasing loss absorbency (i.e. capital requirements) and ensuring that
they can be resolved safely, quickly, and without destabilizing the
financial system and exposing the taxpayer to the risk of loss. The aim
has been thereby to roll back the systemic and moral hazard risks
associated with TBTF institutions and to increase market discipline.
The FSB approach to the TBTF problem rests on three pillars
of: (i) higher loss absorbency in the form of more common equity tier 1
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp00213.pdf.
23. FIN. STABILITY BD., POLICY MEASURES TO ADDRESS SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT
FINANCIAL INSTITIONS (2011), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf.
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capital for banks assessed to be systemically important; (ii) more
intensive and effective supervision of these firms, including holding
them to higher standards in terms of systems and controls and data
aggregation than other firms; and (iii) effective resolution regimes and
resolution planning, including powers and tools to enable creditor-
financed recapitalization, mandatory recovery and resolution planning
for G-SIFIs, negotiation of institution-specific crisis cooperation
agreements within cross-border crisis management groups (CMGs), and
regular resolvability assessments.24
The U.K. authorities have been closely involved in the
development of this approach and have been working directly with their
counterparts in the U.S. to develop effective cross-border resolution
strategies.25 An important post-crisis legislative initiative in the U.K.
was the enactment of the Banking Act 2009, which establishes a Special
Resolution Regime for banks comparable (at least in certain respects) to
the powers long enjoyed by the FDIC.26 The Act, which was a direct
product of the limited options that existed for resolving Northern Rock,
provides the Bank of England, as the resolution authority, with a broad
tool kit for bank resolutions including the power to:
* transfer all or part of a bank's business (its
shares or property, i.e. assets and liabilities) to a
private sector purchaser;
* transfer all or part of a bank's property to a
bridge bank-a subsidiary of the Bank of
England-pending a future sale;
* place a bank into temporary public ownership (a
decision made by the Treasury);
* apply to put a bank into the Bank Insolvency
Procedure (BIP) which is designed to allow for
rapid payments by the Financial Services
24. Id.
25. On December 10, 2012, the FDIC and Bank of England published a joint paper on
resolving internationally active systemically important financial institutions. See FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & BANK OF ENG., RESOLVING GLOBALLY ACTIVE, SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2012), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2012/nrl 56.pdf.
26. Special Resolution, BANK OF ENG.,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/role/risk reduction/srr/default.asp
x (last visited Sep. 12, 2013).
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Compensation Scheme (FSCS) to insured
depositors (or transfer of their accounts to a
healthy bank);
* apply for the use of the Bank Administration
Procedure (BAP) to deal with a part of a bank
that is not transferred and is instead put into
administration.
Although the U.K.'s reform of its framework for bank resolution
represents a significant step beyond the pre-2009 arrangements, which
effectively required failed banks to be dealt with under general
insolvency law, it is still some way short of fully implementing the
recommendations of the FSB's Key Attributes for Effective Resolution
Regimes.27 In a review conducted in early 2013, the FSB found that the
U.K. authorities still lack the power to convert debt into equity as part
of a bank recapitalization and also lack the power to impose a
temporary stay on the early termination of rights in financial contracts. 28
Both gaps in the Bank of England's powers will be addressed once the
European Union's Recovery and Resolution Directive (RRD) is
finalized and implemented.
The FSB's Key Attributes are a major component in its strategy
for resolving systemically important financial institutions described
above. However, doubts nonetheless remain about how effective this
approach to ending TBTF will be in practice. 29  As several
commentators have pointed out, the application of a resolution regime
to a systemically important firm is untried and untested; it relies on the
willingness of resolution authorities in different jurisdictions to
cooperate closely when the incentives are to protect domestic creditors
27. FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATTrRIBUTES FOR EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2011), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_1111 04cc.pdf.
28. FIN. STABILITY BD., THEMATIC REVIEW ON RESOLUTION REGIMES (2013), available
at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 130411 a.pdf.
29. See e.g., Edward F. Green, Dodd-Frank and the Future of Financial Regulation, 2
HARV. BUS. L. REv. ONLINE 79, 88 (2011), available at http://www.hblr.org/?p=1728
("Absent further coordination in cross-border insolvencies of systemically important
financial institutions, we are left with the dilemma of an uneven treatment of creditors and
shareholders and a tendency for the regulators of markets in which large institutions operate
to require operations to be conducted through subsidiaries, to ring-fence assets in those
domestic subsidiaries, to impose liquidity requirements to protect domestic creditors and to
avoid the transfer of assets prior to insolvency.").
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(depositors especially); it is only really suited to dealing with
idiosyncratic problems at an individual firm, rather than with system-
wide risks. Perhaps in response to these concerns, some countries have
adopted structural regulation measures in addition to taking steps to
implement the FSB's proposals and recommendations. These structural
measures are best seen as an attempt to confine the safety net to a subset
of banking activities-payments and intermediation-by separating
them from investment banking and capital market activities. Proposals
for structural reform also aim to improve financial stability by (i)
reducing the risk of cross contamination between investment and
commercial banking, achieved by separating the capital allocated to the
two activities and disallowing blended funding, (ii) acting on the "risk
culture" of firms by reducing the extent to which the incentives and
risk-appetite of transactions-based trading activities are spread to
relationship-based commercial banking activities, and (iii) increasing
the loss absorbency capacity in the banking system and improving the
resolvability of firms.
Three broad models for structural reforms have emerged: one
places an outright prohibition on certain combinations of financial
activity (the Volcker Rule contained in section 619 of the Dodd-Frank
Act). The alternative approaches, associated with both the U.K.'s
Independent Commission on Banking (the ICB or "Vickers
Commission") and the High-Level Expert Group on reforming the
structure of the EU banking sector chaired by Bank of Finland Governor
Erkki Liikanen emphasizes instead the requirement for different types
of financial activity to be conducted by separately capitalized
subsidiaries within a common holding company structure.30 The
fundamental differences between these approaches are summarized in
the table 31 below:
30. Leonardo Gambacorta & Adrian van Rixtel, Structural Bank Regulation Initiatives:
Approaches and Implications 1-4 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 412,
2013).
3 1. Id.
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A stylized comparison of selected structural reform proposals
Volcker Liikanen Vickess
Institutional separation of Subsidiarisation: proprietary Ring-fencing: structural
Broad approach commercial banking and and higher-risk trading activity separation of activities via a
certain investment activities in have to be placed ring fence for retail banks
ia separate legal entity ngfnefrrti ak
Deposit-taking institution may.
- deal as principal in securities
and derivatives No No No
- engage in market-making Yes No No
- perform underwriting business Yes t  Yes Restricted
- hold non-trading exposures to Unrestricted Unrestricted Restricted
other financial intermediaries (inside the group)
Holding companywith banking Not permitted Pernitted Permitted
and trading subsidiaries
Limitations for ring-fenced
Geographical restrictions NO NO banks in the U.K to provide
services outside the European
Economic Area
I Underwriting in response to client/counterparty demand.
Under the ICB approach, each banking group headquartered in
the U.K. will be required to "ring-fence" critical banking services
whose temporary interruption would have a significant direct impact on
the domestic economy, in particular on households and small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The aim of this policy is to:
* insulate critical banking services from shocks
elsewhere in the financial system; and
* make it easier to preserve the continuity of those
services, while resolving financial institutions in
an orderly manner and without injecting
taxpayer funds.
Within its own group the ring-fenced bank will need to be a
separate legal entity with at least half of the board of directors that is
independent of the rest of the group. It should be able to meet capital
and liquidity requirements on a stand-alone basis. Higher capital
requirements will be applied to ring-fenced entities.
"Ring fencing" has two dimensions, referred to in the ICB
report as "location" and "height." The former refers to the designation
of which services should be in and which should be outside the ring-
fenced entity. The latter refers to the permitted relationship between the
ring-fenced entity and other financial institutions, both inside and
outside the same group.
With respect to the location of the ring fence, the U.K.
REGULATORY REFORMIN THE UK.
government plans to mandate that certain financial services should only
be provided by a ring-fenced entity: these are primarily taking retail
deposits and the provision of overdrafts to individuals and small and
medium-sized enterprises. Ring-fenced entities will be permitted to
provide certain other types of financial products and services, such as
consumer and SME loans, mortgages, credit cards, corporate lending,
leasing and factoring, and wealth management advisory services and
ancillary operations necessary to support permitted services (such as the
hedging of credit, market and liquidity risk). However, it will not be
mandatory for these activities to be included within the ring fence and
there will be costs to their inclusion owing to the higher capital
requirements, which the ring-fenced entity will be required to meet.
Certain other services will be excluded from ring-fenced banks,
particularly those which impede resolution and/or increase a ring-fenced
bank's exposure to shocks from financial markets. Activities which
ring-fenced banks will be prohibited from conducting include any
services provided outside the European Economic Area 32 and the
following:
* origination, trading, lending or making markets
in securities (including structured investment
products) or derivatives;
* secondary market purchases of loans and other
financial instruments;
* conduit financing or securitization of assets
originated outside the ring-fenced bank; and
* underwriting of securities issues.
With respect to the "height" of the ring fence, the U.K.
government proposes that ring-fenced banks should be prohibited from
entering into any transaction with a financial institution that results in an
economic exposure to that institution, other than for the purposes of:
32. The U.K.'s obligations under the European Union Treaties prohibit it from
discriminating between financial services that are provided domestically and those that are
provided in other EU Member States or members of the European Economic Area. In
consequence, it was not possible for the U.K. to follow the strict logic of the ring-fencing
approach, which would have been to restrict the ring-fenced entity to purely domestic
operations.
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* facilitating payments for other financial
institutions (ring-fenced banks should be
permitted to settle payments for financial
institutions; this will naturally result in
exposures, so these activities should be
monitored closely so that they do not undermine
the aim of the restriction);
* the management of liquidity (where ring-fenced
banks may place deposits with other financial
institutions and hold claims as part of their
liquidity resources, as approved by the
regulator); and
* acting as derivatives counterparties for the
purposes of ring-fenced banks' risk management
(subject to certain safeguards).
Ring-fenced banks will be prohibited from dealing with
counterparties which (i) engage in financial intermediation, and (ii)
those which may be highly leveraged, have a high degree of maturity or
liquidity mismatch, or have a high degree of financial
interconnectedness. The Prudential Regulatory Authority will be
empowered to issue rules that will restrict their dealings with other
types of financial institution including: (i) non-ring-fenced banks, or
banks that engage in otherwise prohibited activities; (ii) investment
firms; (iii) funds and fund management companies; and (iv) insurance
companies. The regulator will also impose limits on large exposures,
intra-group transactions, and intra-group funding (for example limits on
the proportion of the ring fenced banks funding that is derived from the
rest of the group.)
The ICB proposed ring-fencing of U.K. banks' retail operations
without going as far as to require full institutional separation of
commercial from investment banking, as it recognized that there were
financial stability benefits arising from the diversification of business.
lines and activities; it argued that a diversified financial group would be
better placed to absorb shocks arising from either the capital markets or
the real economy than would stand-alone entities. For this reason, the
ICB decided not to recommend the complete separation of trading
activities from commercial banking, but instead to require domestic
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deposit-taking activities to be placed inside a ring-fenced entity which
could, nonetheless, be part of a diversified financial group, and
recommended a higher level of capital for ring-fenced activities. The
ICB also concluded that there were difficulties in drawing the Volcker
Rule's distinction between proprietary trading and hedging activities
and therefore proposed a narrow definition of the range of activities that
would be permitted within the ring-fence, principally domestic deposit
taking and lending to households and SMEs. The extent to which
certain simple hedging instruments (e.g. interest rate swaps) may be
permitted within the ring-fence has emerged as one of the main issues in
designing proposals to implement the ICB's recommendations.
The U.K. government introduced the Banking Reform Bill into
parliament on February 4, 2013 to implement many of the
recommendations of the Independent Commission on Banking; it is
expected to complete its passage through parliament and come into
force in early 2014. The reforms will be in place by 2019. In the draft
legislation the ring-fencing proposals have been largely retained intact,
although differences have emerged between the government and a
special committee of both Houses of Parliament, the Parliamentary
Commission on Banking (PCB), on the extent to which the ring-fence
should be "electrified." The PCB has recommended that attempts by
individual banks to circumvent the ring-fence should result in
supervisory action to break-up the group and that there should be a
formal review at a specified future date of the effectiveness of the ring-
fencing arrangements, with a view to adopting full separation of
investment and commercial banking. At the time of writing, the
government has accepted the first of these recommendations but not the
second. A further point of contention between the government and the
parliamentary commission concerns the "leverage ratio" which should
be applied to U.K. banks. The government favors applying the three
percent ratio which forms part of the internationally agreed Basel III
framework, while the PCB favors a more restrictive four percent ratio.
One factor in the government's reluctance to raise the leverage ratio
above the international minimum could be that two large U.K. banks,
both of which have substantial government ownership as the result of
bailouts during the crisis, would be unable to reach the higher ratio
without either fresh capital raising or reducing the volume of their assets
at a time when the domestic supply of credit has become a politically
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contentious issue.
III. ASSESSMENT OF THE U.K. REFORMS
Both major elements of the U.K.'s post-crisis regulatory reforms
reflect the importance of political economy factors in the design of
regulation. The reform to the institutional structure of regulation was
shaped by the perception that the single regulator model had "failed"
both in its ability to provide effective supervision of the banking sector
pre-crisis and in providing a basis for an effective crisis management
arrangement once problems in the sector began to emerge. However,
the reforms were undoubtedly underpinned by more overtly political
factors-in particular the close identification of the single regulator with
the previous government and the fact that, in contrast to most major
institutional reforms in the U.K., it was not the product of a prior
consultation exercise aimed at building a broad consensus.
Although a consensus in favor of a single regulator did emerge
once the decision to create it had already been made, in reality it rested
on flimsy foundations, the result of a fait accompli rather than a
compelling case for a fully integrated regulatory agency. The reforms
also commanded widespread support from the financial sector, which
welcomed a single regulatory agency as reducing duplication and
overlap in rules and their enforcement, thereby resulting in lower direct
compliance costs. Maintaining the competitive position of the City of
London vis-A-vis rival financial centers was an explicit objective of the
1997 reforms, to the extent that competitiveness considerations were
written into the FSA's statutory objectives. The extent to which this
strategy was initially successful is indicated by the report commissioned
by Mayor and Senator Schumer referenced earlier. 33 However, in a
post-crisis environment it no longer appeared politically desirable to
place such heavy emphasis on using regulation to support the City's
competitiveness or in meeting industry demands for "light touch"
regulation. Instead, the primary goal of public policy became that of
protecting taxpayers against the contingent liability that arises from
playing host to a large financial center. This provided the background
against which the new Coalition government was able to enact its
proposals with relatively little opposition or resistance from the
33. See MCELWEE & TYRIE, supra note 8.
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industry. Arguments deployed by the financial sector against the
reforms that were based on alleged transition costs or the higher on-
going operating costs of the new system could gain very little traction
with law-makers given the evident failings of the previous system and
the fact that industry concerns carried very little weight in a post-crisis
environment.
The U.K. approach of de-merging a highly integrated regulatory
agency reflects a very different institutional starting point to the U.S.,
where the emphasis over the years has been on bringing about greater
integration of regulatory agencies. A 2008 Treasury Department
proposal for institutional reform, often referred to as the "Paulson Plan,"
also built on a "Twin Peaks" approach to regulatory structure.34 The
Treasury proposal envisaged a new Prudential Financial Regulatory
Authority (PFRA) that would be responsible for the safety and
soundness of individual firms with some type of explicit government
guarantee of their business operations (e.g. banks and insurance
companies) while a consolidated business conduct regulator (a Conduct
of Business Regulatory Agency or CBRA) would be responsible for
monitoring the business conduct of all financial firms. The underlying
logic of these proposals was obviously very close to the objectives-
based concept that underpinned the Twin Peaks approach that the U.K.
eventually adopted. Nonetheless, although the CBRA survived in the
attenuated form of the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (without
the addition of the consumer protection role of the SEC and CFTC as
originally envisaged) few of the other ideas embodied in the Paulson
Plan survived into the Dodd-Frank Act. The reasons are complex and
the episode deserves to be researched in more detail than has so far been
the case. Nonetheless, a change of administration, the lobbying of
industry groups that had established close links with existing regulatory
agencies, and reluctance of Congressional committees to abandon their
oversight role of specific agencies all arguably played a part.
There has been a strong political consensus in the U.K. in favor
of addressing TBTF financial institutions, especially as the economic
and fiscal costs of support to the banking sector in early 2009 have
become apparent. Britain faces the TBTF problem in a particularly
34. U.S. DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT FOR
A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATION STRUCTURE (Mar. 2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf.
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acute form-banks that are large relative to the size of the economy and
which represent a significant contingent liability for the government in
the event that they have to be bailed out (sometimes referred to as the
"too big to save" problem). Despite post-crisis deleveraging, the British
banking system is still around 450 percent of U.K. national output.
Several countries with large banking systems have found that the costs
of providing capital support to the sector have called into question the
solvency of the sovereign itself (Iceland, Ireland and Cyprus among
others). Although the U.K. banking system is not as large relative to the
economy as in these countries, the contingent liability that results from
hosting large, globally active banks is now recognized by politicians
from all political parties to represent a major risk to the sovereign and
taxpayers.
At the same time, however, the general view among British
policymakers is that playing host to large, globally-active banks
generates significant economic benefits to the U.K. in terms of direct
and indirect employment, corporation and personal taxation, and
securing London's position as an international financial center. Almost
all British politicians regard the City of London as a vital economic
asset which they therefore will take the necessary policy measures to
defend. This political commitment has meant that threats (even if only
implicit) by the senior management of some large U.K. banks to
consider relocating to "friendlier" jurisdictions carry real force, even if
only the most cursory analysis would suggest that such threats are
largely hollow, since they assume that any possible alternative location
for the mind and management of these firms would be any more
comfortable with the resulting contingent liability on the public finances
than is currently the case in the U.K. The ring-fencing approach
outlined by the Independent Commission on Banking was the outcome
of these competing political pressures, and to this extent represents
something of a political balancing act.
The ring-fencing proposals are intended to address the TBTF
problem by tightly circumscribing U.K. banks' domestic financial
functions, thus ensuring that any future support can be targeted to
protect local depositors and to ensure the flow of credit to British
businesses. Although EU law prohibits the ring-fence from being
applied on a national basis-the relevant geographical scope is the
European Economic Area-the intention behind the legislation is
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clearly to limit the U.K. government's contingent liability to only a
subset of the activities of globally active banks. The aim has been to
limit the U.K. government's contingent liability while avoiding the
imposition of conditions on U.K.-based banks that are so harsh that they
might relocate elsewhere. In consequence, the U.K. has been taken in a
radically different direction to the U.S., following the incorporation of
the "Volcker Rule" in the Dodd-Frank Act. The ICB itself concluded
that there were economic benefits from the diversified, "universal"
banking model, including the stability of earnings over time, that should
be preserved. Rather than recommending a strict separation of
commercial and investment banking, the ICB instead sought to preserve
the model but in a way that ensures that large universal banks will
become easier to resolve and that the U.K.'s contingent liability to
support globally-active financial institutions will be limited as a result.
Two other factors influenced the U.K.'s decision not to follow
the Volcker Rule's imposition of a bright line separation of banking
from capital markets trading activities. The first is that historically the
U.K. has never had structural regulation to separate banking from
securities business (along the lines of Glass-Steagall in the U.S.),
despite the fact that until the mid-1980s such a separation was observed
in practice. The separation was the result of private ordering,
particularly Stock Exchange rules that required member firms be
established as partnerships, rather than statutory requirements. Thus
there has been no precedent for British legislators imposing specific
business models on financial institutions. The second is that the debate
in the U.K. was able to draw on the experience of the U.S. in
implementing the Volcker Rule. The difficulties of developing a
workable definition of "trading" activities, which could be clearly
differentiated from market making, has become apparent during the
U.S. regulators' implementation efforts. Even legislators who are
sympathetic to the case for separating banking and trading activities
have recognized this problem. 35
35. See e.g., PARLIAMENTARY COMM. ON BANKING STANDARDS, PROPRIETARY
TRADING, 2013, H.C. 1034 (U.K.).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the differences between U.K. and U.S.
approaches to post-crisis financial reforms reflect the same factors that
were highlighted in my paper with Heidi Schooner that took in a much
longer historical sweep of contrasts and comparisons of the two
countries' approach to bank regulation. 36  These factors include
differences in assumptions about the role and purposes of regulation,
institutional structures, legal systems and, in particular, the political
economy of financial regulation. In the reform process that has
followed the financial crisis, the U.K.'s focus has been on handing
powers back to a central bank that had been removed of its
responsibilities for banking supervision and on reducing the risks to
British taxpayers that arise from hosting large, globally active financial
institutions that are much larger in relation to the size of the British
economy than even the largest U.S. institutions are in relation to theirs.
Both of these aspects of the U.K.'s reform agenda have no parallels in
the U.S., despite underlying similarities of analysis and approach that
have found expression in the international reform agenda.
36. Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael W. Taylor, Convergence and Competition:
The Case of Bank Regulation In Britain and the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 595
(1999).
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